INTRODUCTION

1.
The provision of telecommunications services plays an important role in both individual wellbeing and a country's economic development. For this reason, general availability of telecommunications services -to all consumers regardless of income level and geographic location within the country -has generally been viewed as an important policy goal. There has been much debate about how such a goal of universal service is best achieved: through government monopoly provision, fully private provision or some combination of public and private funding and provision. Some have argued that liberalisation (i.e., allowing entry of competitive suppliers, including foreign private suppliers) of telecommunications services can contribute to achieving universal service, However, others have feared that it can actually undermine universal provision where, for example, foreign private providers "cherry pick" consumers with the greatest capacity to pay or the most profitable regions, leaving less profitable customers/regions underserved.
2.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the major issues relating to universal access and universal service provision. It explores whether and, if so, how liberalisation can contribute to achieving universal service goals and the types of complementary policies, or regulatory underpinnings that may be required. It discusses the choices available to and used by governments in various countries to ensure greater availability of quality basic telecommunications services in liberalised markets.
3.
The paper draws together the broad conceptual issues and the main conclusions emerging from available empirical evidence, cross-country as well as case studies. It addresses a number of key issues, including:
• How are universal access goals defined in the telecommunications sector?
• Is there a potential conflict between efficiency and equity goals?
• How has liberalisation -particularly in terms of eliminating barriers for foreign providersaffected access to telecommunications services for the poor? • Where liberalisation has been undertaken, what sorts of regulatory mechanisms and market incentives have been used to ensure universal service? • Did policies aimed at ensuring universal service use mechanisms directed at the consumer (e.g., subsidies, vouchers)? • What sorts of mechanisms have been used to encourage service providers to increase provision of services to previously unserved or underserved regions or consumers? How effective have such mechanisms been? Did the mechanisms or policies used encourage providers to develop new or innovative solutions to universal service problems or did they focus on the use of existing technologies and solutions? • The role of technological innovation in providing new solutions to universal service challenges.
• What sort of regulatory bodies exist to regulate the service in question? What sorts of approaches, if any, were used to attain cost-effective administration of these bodies? What technical or capacity building assistance was provided?
4.
Structure of the paper. The paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, section 2 discusses how universal service goals are defined. Section 3 examines the impact of market liberalisation, especially the evidence of success in terms of achieving promised benefits of liberalisation. The paper finds that there is considerable evidence of success in terms of increased penetration of 7.
The major dimensions of universal service and universal access goals include:
• Availability -that the level of service is the same wherever a person lives or works (including quality of service), so that residing in a high cost rural or remote area does not affect his ability to access communications services; • Affordability -that the level of services is affordable by everyone; and • Accessibility -that people with disability can use the service, so that a person's level of physical and mental ability does not disadvantage that person in terms of access to communications services.
No standard universal service definition
8. Universal access and universal service are not fixed concepts and there is no single 'standard' definition of what should be defined within the scope of such obligations.
9.
The universal service provision in the Reference Paper attached to the 1997 WTO agreement on basic telecommunications (Section 3) is stated in very general terms. It acknowledges "the right" of each member country "to define the kind of universal service obligation it wishes to maintain", and it states that such obligations will not be regarded as anti-competitive per se. However, it qualifies this right with the proviso that universal service obligations be "administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and are not more burdensome than necessary for the kind of universal service defined by the Member." 1 10.
Universal service requirements can vary considerably among countries depending on the level of development of the telecommunications infrastructure. For instance, in developing countries a universal access program can aim to achieve the installation of one payphone to cover a remote area, while in developed countries it could aim to provide not only voice but also data services. In fact, there is now debate over whether the scope of universal service should be expanded to include advanced services, such as Internet and broadband services 2 . Indeed, governments in an increasing number of countries are already installing programs that seek to improve access to the Internet. But it should be recognized that such government assistance programs are distinct from the mandated delivery of universal service obligations, irrespective of income and location that is the focus of this paper.
11.
To ensure universal access is achieved, it is important to be clear about precisely what types of access is being sought e.g., specific goals for both individual service and community or shared access should be made clear. It is also important to be clear about what types of services are being targeted, whether voice only, voice and data, fixed line and mobile, Internet, broadband, etc. Moreover, universal service is a dynamic concept whose definition and coverage will need to be revised as conditions in a country change. Decisions relating to the scope and extent of the universal service requirements are generally made by the responsible Ministry and the legislature. This recognizes the fact that decisions 1 According to Roseman this provision balanced the concerns of Canada and the United States which had achieved virtually universal service largely by means of private operators, with the skepticism of the Europeans and others regarding the ability to achieve universal service objectives without direct governmental interventions. See Roseman, D, "Domestic regulation and trade in telecommunications services: experience and prospects under the GATS" in "Domestic Regulation and Service Trade Regulation" Aaditya Mattoo and Pierre Sauve (eds) World Bank and Oxford University Press 2003.
2
For a discussion of the issues relating to this debate see Xavier, P, "Universal Service Obligations and Broadband," Info, May 2003. relating to the scope of universal service should take into account social, political and development considerations which are appropriately made through a country's legislative and political processes. Regulators and policy makers have a critical role to play in determining measurable targets for universal access/service and monitoring achievement of these targets.
EU universal service directive
12.
The approach to universal service in the European Union provides an example of a recent redefinition of the nature and scope of universal service to apply across a number of relatively developed countries. The new EU regulatory framework adopted by the European Union in February 2002 sets out the three main elements of universal service to be provided, namely:
• Provision of Access at a Fixed Location • Provision of Directory Enquiry Services and Directories • Provision of Public Pay Telephones
13.
European Union Member States of the European Union are free to impose other obligations on telecommunications companies. But where they do so, other market players cannot be required to contribute to the resulting costs.
14.
Provision of Access at a Fixed Location. A fundamental requirement of universal service in the EU is that all "reasonable" requests for connection at a fixed location to the public telephone network and for access to publicly available telephone services at a fixed location are to be met by at least one operator. The connection, as well as being able to support local, national, international and facsimile calls, must also be capable of supporting data communications at bit rates that are sufficient to permit 'functional' Internet access, taking into account prevailing technologies used by the majority of subscribers and technological feasibility.
15.
Directory Enquiry Services and Directories. The universal service obligation in regard to directory information includes:
• the provision of a comprehensive printed directory of subscribers to all end users free of charge and at least one a year
• the provision of a comprehensive national and international telephone directory enquiry service to all end users, including users of public pay telephones
• the obligation to keep a record of all subscribers of publicly available telephone services in
• the State, including those with fixed, personal and mobile numbers.
16.
Public Pay Telephones. The regulator can impose obligations regarding the provision of public payphones to meet the reasonable needs of end-users in terms of the geographical coverage, the number of telephones, the accessibility of such telephones to disabled users and the quality of services.
17.
With the dramatic take up of pre-paid and post paid mobile telephony payphone revenues have steadily declined. As a consequence, some further reductions in the number of payphones in both urban and rural areas may be unavoidable. However, payphones continue to provide a key service to some, including disadvantaged consumers, and remain important for universal access in many developing countries.
Box 2. Universal Service obligations in a developed economy (the UK)
Under the UK Communications Act 2003, Ofcom requires BT and Kingston Communications to provide a range of universal services including:
• public pay phones
• low cost schemes to help those on low incomes
• telephone lines capable of delivering dial-up Internet access
• special services for people with disabilities.
Source: Ofcom web site at http://www.ofcom.org.uk
18.
In the UK, the universal service providers have to publish plans to remove the last remaining public pay phone from a particular local call area, then consult on those plans for 42 days (during which time local public bodies can veto a proposed removal). In its consultation document on universal service (Ofcom 2005) 3 , Ofcom proposes that this local veto system be retained, with an extended 90 day consultation period and an appeals process to help resolve disputes. Ofcom is also consulting on the need for new guidelines regarding the obligation to provide pay phones to make the system clear and consistent. These guidelines would take account of the:
• number of households in the area;
• distance from nearest alternative public call box;
• number of calls made from a call box and its profitability; and • status of mobile phone coverage in the area.
19
. Table 1 provides an indication of the nature of universal access and universal service programs in various APEC economies. The cross country comparison of economies in the APEC region is interesting because it includes developed as well as developing countries. 3 Ofcom, "Review of the Universal Service Obligation," 10 January 2005.
Available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk. 
IMPACT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET LIBERALISATION
Why primary reliance on market forces is critical
20
. Figure 1 indicates two separate 'gaps' that need to be addressed with quite different mechanisms in the quest for universal service.
21.
The market efficiency gap is the difference between what markets are actually achieving under current conditions, and what can be achieved through further market liberalization and vigorous procompetition regulation. The market efficiency gap should be perceived not only in terms of present technology but the technological prospects on the horizon (discussed later).
22.
The access gap refers to the people (e.g., those living in rural and remote areas) who would remain beyond the limits of the market unless additional service delivery is stimulated through subsidies to encourage service provision.
Why rely primarily on the market?
23.
Those who support primary reliance on market forces argue that the greater is market supply, the fewer the areas/people needing subsidy assistance (and the greater the capacity to assist them). In this view, the most effective way of addressing universal access and universal service objectives in a sustainable way is to harness the development of market-based, commercially attractive businesses to address the task.
24.
Primary reliance on the market is preferred because government funded or philanthropic programs are vulnerable to modification/reversal for political and budgetary reasons, such as when a government of a different political ideology comes into power. Besides, a government-driven program can be accompanied by red tape and bureaucratic inflexibility.
25.
This is not to argue that government should not be involved. Only that government action can be more effective if it helps maximize the role of the private sector thereby allowing government to focus on areas the market is unable to serve. This approach also minimizes the subsidies required.
26.
It is also important to recognize that subsidization programs can in fact have the effect of limiting or distorting competition in rural and remote areas. This is because potential market entrants could be discouraged if they have to compete against a subsidized provider offering service at prices significantly below costs. Thus such programs may turn out to have only short term advantage if they result in adverse long run outcomes, including distortions to the nature, extent and speed of technological innovation and investment.
27.
There are also concerns that dependence on subsidy programs, especially if unnecessary or premature:
• assume that the market would fail;
• can involve guessing what the market and services will be;
• can deny some market operators the opportunity to offer commercial services because of subsidies paid to other operators; • may provide or subsidize services which many users may be able to pay for on a normal commercial basis;
• may deter market entry due to the costs that universal access policies impose on market participants; • can impose a considerable cost on consumers (who may bear the final incidence of universal access costs imposed on operators).
28.
Arguments on behalf of uneconomic telecommunications subscribers should be constrained by the concern that an unreasonable cost burden not be imposed on other (economic) subscribers.
29.
There is a broad perception that where pressure to be commercially successful is absent, operators have less incentives to ensure good service, especially in less competed for lower profit areas. The result could include:
• unreliable lines (and less disposition to improve technology used) • poor line location • poor customer service • less incentives for efficiency • poor access to phone cards, etc.
30.
In this view, the role of policy and regulatory frameworks would be to strengthen market forces since this will result in: network development and modernization; lower prices, greater attention to customer choice and the flexibility to facilitate an accelerated market diffusion of services, even to niche market areas once considered uneconomic. 
Market forces and technological development
31.
A concern that universal service programs do not impede or distort the entry of new technology is particularly legitimate since significant changes in rural universal access is seen to be increasingly likely. These changes will stem from the new suite of wireless technologies such as WiFi and WiMax (which promises telecommunications coverage over a radius of about 50 km) that could provide Internet access and voice service cheaply to rural and under-served communities. Such developments can assist in making rural and low-income markets profitable, affordable, and sustainable. But this also requires an environment in which market forces can facilitate innovation and creative business initiatives.
32.
Mobile communications is an example of how technology has extended the limits of market forces in reaching areas unserved by the fixed network, often at lower cost 4 . Mobile operators have translated this lower cost base into affordable pre-paid packages that allow low income users a basic connection to the network. Pre-payment allows operators to lower operational costs and reduce credit risk, but also gives users more control over expenditure than traditional post paid solutions, thus increasing accessibility to low income users. Mobile services are increasingly available to rural users as well. Indeed, the wireless expansion can mean that some operators specializing in the provision of rural service can provide service even in the most remote areas.
33.
Competition has resulted in lower prices and lower prices have meant greater affordability which means better access. Mobile has brought other innovations as well, such as public mobile payphones and SMS. Indeed, SMS is cheaper than voice and means that mobile users can engage in a kind of email. In fact, some even argue that mobile has virtually eliminated the universal access problem for many of the urban poor and for many rural users as well.
Technological-neutrality for cost-effective delivery of universal access in rural areas
34.
Wireless communication technologies, such as fixed wireless access and very small aperture terminals (VSATs), can be effective means of establishing telecommunication networks in rural areas due to their advantages over wired telecommunications in terms of cost and ease of installation. For example, when installing telephones in sparsely populated rural areas, wireless communication technologies can be used in conjunction with satellite stations to achieve coverage of isolated settlements over long distances.
35.
With spectrum becoming an increasingly important resource, there is need to review spectrum allocation and management policy with a view to allowing more flexible use of spectrum, including spectrum trading and liberalization. This will enable: a bigger role for the market in deciding how much spectrum should be allocated to different uses; faster flexible access to spectrum, including unused and underused spectrum; the development of new, spectrum efficient technologies; and innovation in the use of the spectrum and spectrum based products and services. 4 Much of the cost advantage of mobile telephony networks stems from the fact that the access network is shared between subscribers. Once this access network is in place, the marginal cost of adding another subscriber is very low, being mainly the cost of a handset. This contrasts with traditional fixed wireline networks where the incremental cost of adding additional subscribers is significant as each subscriber has dedicated access network infrastructure. Hence the cost of adding a mobile subscriber is much less than that of adding a fixed wireline subscriber. The role of mobile communications in universal access is covered in greater depth in Sonja Oestmann, "Mobile operators: their contribution to universal service and public access", January 2003.
36.
Satellite systems have also been developing technologically enhancing ability to serve rural areas. Prices for VSATs have fallen rapidly allowing manufacturers to expand sales of VSAT systems into lowend applications such as rural telephony.
Box 3. An example of VSAT-based provision of rural telephony
In 1998, Peru's telecommunications regulator (FITEL) invited tenders to award a 20-year, subsidized concession to provide rural payphones in the remote regions of Tumbes, Piura, Cajamarca and Amazonas. Participants in the tender submitted bids indicating the lowest government subsidy they would be willing to accept in order to build the network.
The solution selected by FITEL was based on VSAT technology. The cost-reducing principles behind the winning solution, submitted by GVT del Peru, included the following:
• VSAT-based thin route telephony with up to three voice channels per VSAT
• low power consumption of approximately 40 watts per VSAT, since 90% of sites lacked commercial electricity supply
• star network topology using 7.6 m Hub station in the capital city and a 1.2 m or 1.8 m remote VSAT station in each town
• use of simple, rugged payphones with a prepaid system instead of coins, to reduce the number of field trips to payphone installations
• centralised network management system at the Hub.
Based on this configuration, GVT del Peru proposed to cover the costs of building, installing and operating the network with a government subsidy of US$4,909,292 over 5 years. The remaining costs would be borne by the operator and recovered from service revenues. According to FITEL, the subsidy amounted to public expenditure of US$ 11 per inhabitant.
Source: OSIPTEL "Telecommunications Sector in Peru presentation to APEC TEL28" Presented by Liliana Ruiz de Alonso www.apectelwg.org/apec/atwg/previous.html#16 , 2003.
37.
Power-line. Use of the power grid as a communications network -known as "broadband over power lines" (BPL) in the US, and "power-line communications" (PLC) in Europe -appears to be finally receiving official acceptance with the FCC approving the use of power-line technology in the US in October 2004. Advocates of the technology argue that it promises several advantages offering not only voice but broadband with connection speed not dependent on distance from the telephone exchange (as with DSL), or on the number of customers (as with cable). Also, unlike its rivals, power-line offers uploads at the same speed as downloads and promises to offer far more capacity than today's cable networks. Moreover, the technology will reportedly 5 allow utilities to: monitor what is happening on their power grids in real time, down to local substations; read power and water meters without entering customers' premises; and manage peak loads by, for example, turning down a residential air conditioner remotely while a customer is at the office, in return for a lower tariff.
38.
"Stratellite" technology. Floating in the stratosphere at an altitude of about 20km (13 miles), a "stratellite" would behave just like a geostationary satellite, hovering over a particular spot and relaying radio signals to and from the ground. Like satellites, these airships will be able to provide wide-area mobile telephone coverage, paging and other communications services. However, it is claimed that such airships will be much cheaper to launch and maintain than satellites and can do things that satellites cannot.
39.
There is considerable excitement over the prospect that stratellites could be able to provide wireless broadband coverage, akin to Wi-Fi, over large areas. Advocates claim that a single airship could potentially provide coverage over an area of about 800,000 square kilometers. It should thus be possible to create "hotzones" of coverage encapsulating entire cities and their surrounding countryside, rather than the smaller "hotspots" of Wi-Fi coverage found in airports and coffee shops. Moreover, Stratellites are expected to cost much less than satellites (about US$20 million each) and can be reused. After hovering for 18 months they can be recovered for servicing and then re-launched.
40.
All this is not meant to argue that the technologies mentioned above will live up to their promises, or that one should be preferred to another. It is simply to argue that the market must be kept open and universal service programs maintain technological-neutrality to allow the most cost-effective technology available now and in the future to be introduced to address the challenge of universal access/service (and the opportunity of "leap-frogging" developing countries into the technological frontier).
Evidence of the success of market liberalization
41.
Experience around the world has shown that the entry of private telecommunications operators into the market improves teledensity and increases the profitability of telecommunications operators by providing incentives for efficient operation, greater levels of investment and network rollout.
42.
Further scope to enhance market forces. There is still considerable scope to enhance the role of competitive forces in delivering universal service. For instance, in the APEC region, while only two economies (Brunei Darussalam and Papua New Guinea) have a monopoly in the fixed network, in most economies the incumbent operator controls more than 90 percent of local access lines (see Table A .1 in the Statistical Appendix to this paper). So there is still only very limited competition in the supply of customer access lines and this influences the ability of market forces to help achieve universal service. In markets that are now focusing on broadband, the lack of effective choice in the fixed local loop has become an important policy issue.
43.
Impact of market liberalization. The impact of market liberalization on universal service can be assessed particularly through: (i) increased levels of teledensity; and (ii) lower prices (which improves affordability). More general analyses of the impact of market liberalization, including impacts on productivity, investment, quality of service, etc., are available in the various editions of the OECD's Communications Outlook (updated every two years). Here there is a wealth of data and analysis evidencing that market liberalization has been fundamental to the growth of the telecommunications sector in OECD countries. As Communications Outlook 2005 concludes: "..the opening of markets promoted competition, and in turn, brought a tremendous expansion of access and increasing innovation in services" 6 44.
Increased teledensity. Total teledensity (i.e., both fixed line and mobile) has increased in all countries. But due to the popularity of mobile service (and ADSL which makes a second line for Internet use unnecessary), some economies have seen declines in fixed teledensity. Indeed, mobile teledensity now exceeds fixed line in most APEC economies. (See Table A .2 in the Statistical Appendix.) Moreover (as Table A .3 in the Statistical Appendix indicates), the coverage of mobile service now averages 99% for the OECD countries. Pre-paid customers have been a major driver of mobile usage increasing to represent an average of over 40% of all customers in 2003 (OECD Communications Outlook 2005). These trends which have impacted significantly on 'availability' and 'affordability' of telecommunications are of close interest to universal service.
45.
Lower prices. Lower prices help to address universal service by improving affordability. Domestic long distance revenue per minute in relatively developed economies has fallen by 25 per cent (Australia) to 50 per cent (New Zealand and Chinese Taipei) since 1998. Chile and Russia are the only two developing economies where domestic long distance prices are higher than they were in 1998. In the Philippines, Peru and Mexico, prices are 40 percent below 1998 levels and between 50 and 60 percent lower in Malaysia and China. (See Table A . 12 in the Statistical Appendix.)
46.
In the developed APEC economies (except Korea and Singapore), international prices have fallen more than domestic long distance prices because that is where profit margins are highest and competition is fiercest at the start of competition. (See Table A .13 in the Statistical Appendix.) Also, there is additional pressure on international prices from call-back operators, simple international resale (where this is permitted) and now VoIP or Internet based voice services. International prices have fallen from 45 percent (USA) to 69 per cent (Hong Kong, China). In the case of developing economies, international prices have hardly changed since 1998 in Chile, Vietnam, Indonesia and Russia. In the remaining developing economies, international prices have fallen between 40 percent (Mexico) and 70 percent (China and the Philippines).
47.
Mobile service is still a premium service in terms of call prices (See Table A .4 in the Statistical Appendix) but it has the attraction of low up-front connection fees (i.e., handset plus SIM card), instant access (i.e., no waiting list) and control of budget with pre-paid comprising over 60 percent of mobile services in developing economies.
48.
The other distinctive feature of price changes resulting from market liberalization has been increases in line rentals. Australia has had the biggest increase in line rentals for residential customers since 1998 (47%) with no change before 2000. Among the other developed economies in the APEC region, Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei have seen large increases since 1998 (see Table A .14 in the Statistical Appendix). The implications of price rebalancing are discussed further later.
Developing countries
49.
The World Bank has observed that when competition, privatization and pro-competitive regulation were introduced into telecommunications markets in Latin America, basic line rollout grew approximately three times faster than in countries with a state monopoly provider and twice as fast than those with private monopolies. Similarly in Africa, countries with liberalized telecommunications networks had costs of Internet access eight times lower than those with closed markets.
50.
Many studies (Ramamurti 1996; Ros 1999; Bortolotti et al., 2001; Laffont and N'Guessan 2002; Li and Xu 2001; Rohlfs et al., 2000) confirm 7 that provision of service by private operators in the telecommunications sector improves teledensity and profitability of the business However, the level of competition is largely dependent on the effectiveness of the regulatory agency in creating a level playing field for all operators, and requires the regulatory environment of the telecommunications industry to be conducive to a well-functioning competitive market. This can be achieved through legal and regulatory mechanisms that promote, among other things: fair and nondiscriminatory interconnection between telecommunications operators; cost-oriented tariffs, and the elimination of internal cross-subsidies; as well as recourse to a strong and truly independent regulatory most countries which have liberalized their fixed mobile and data markets have levels of teledensity and Internet use which are higher than countries that have relied on the provision of services through an incumbent monopolist.
51.
Part of the reason for the success of mobile telephony in reaching more people in both urban and rural areas has been the innovative pricing structures which have been developed as competitors battled to win market share from rival operators. As Hodge observes, approximately 80% of all mobile phones in Southern Africa are bought on a prepaid basis. This means that the subscriber pays no monthly connection charges after they have purchased the phone. Contrasting this with the high access fees for fixed line telephony, Hodge estimates mobile phone use is affordable to 70% of households, while fixed line connections are affordable to only 30% of households 9 .
52.
A similar conclusion emerges from an examination of information relating to the status of competition and privatization in fixed and mobile markets in Africa and the levels of teledensity and universal access in the region. In the countries surveyed (see Table A .8, Table A .10 and Table A .11 in the Statistical Appendix), fixed line facilities was almost non-existent in 1997 and privatization of the incumbent operator was at an early stage. By contrast, most countries had introduced competitors in their mobile market segments by 2002 and had more liberal provisions in regard to foreign ownership of mobile operators. As a consequence, most countries have higher teledensity of mobile by comparison with fixed services. By 2002, in all but one of the countries surveyed, mobile subscribers had grown from an insignificant base to the point where they outnumbered fixed line subscribers. By contrast, fixed line growth has been flat and in some cases negative with only negligible improvements in fixed line teledensity.
Box 4. Nigeria's GSM Umbrella People
Nigeria is Africa's most populated nation with some 124 million inhabitants in 2002. Until August 2001, Nigeria had one of the lowest teledensity rates in the world. In February 2001 the government awarded three 15-year mobile cellular GSM licences for US$ 285 million and the rise in the number of mobile subscribers has been dramatic reaching two million subscribers by March 2003. Mobile coverage was initially limited to Lagos, the largest city, but has now spread to 219 out of 550 local government areas. Although handsets and prepaid cards are expensive, service is being extended to those who cannot afford a mobile handset and prepaid card through so-called "umbrella people".
Many Nigerian streets are now decorated with umbrellas marking the stands operated by makeshift GSM resellersthus giving these entrepreneurs (most of them young women) their nickname: "umbrella people". All they need is an umbrella, a plastic table and some chairs, a Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) card and handset -and they are ready for business. An interesting development is the procurement of handsets and subscriptions to each of Nigeria's three mobile service providers, then the hiring of "subcontractors" (often young boys or girls) to operate each handset, tripling the potential returns. Critics of GSM services in Nigeria have disparaged the high tariffs and substandard services rendered by operators. But GSM has indisputably played a role in helping to provide universal access in Nigeria, while also appearing to give low-income Nigerians an avenue for gainful entrepreneurship. agency, capable of enforcing rules. Regulators also have the challenge of creating market-oriented incentives that make service provision to poor and rural areas commercially viable. 
The conflict between Efficiency and Equity
53.
In many countries, the extension of universal service has been promoted by the crosssubsidization of line rentals and local call charges from high prices in international and national long distance call revenues. As competition drives prices towards costs, cross-subsidies cannot be sustained. New entrants are largely attracted to providing services where prices are well above costs (for international and long distance) avoiding local markets where prices are often below costs. To defend market share incumbent operators are forced to reduce long distance prices thereby reducing the gap between price and cost that makes them vulnerable to competitive entry. To offset the fall in revenue from long distance calls, incumbents have increased line rentals and frequently also local call charges. This is commonly referred to as 'price rebalancing'.
54
. Table 2 shows the price rebalancing that has occurred in OECD countries as a whole. There have been significant rises in fixed charges. But usage prices have declined significantly for both residential as well as business users especially since 1997 although this has been offset to some extent by significant rises in fixed charges. The overall fall in prices has been greater for business users (especially large corporate users) than for residential users. These price decreases do not take into account the price falls made available through the price discount schemes that have been accessible to a growing number of both business as well as residential consumers. 
55.
As Communications Outlook 2005 concludes: "While the direct impact of rebalancing has been to shift the relative weight of charges, the decline in usage charges is directly attributable to increasing competition. For business users the gains have been particularly noticeable with increased liberalization. Most of the gains have been made since 1998 coinciding with widespread liberalization in that year. The rise in prices in 2004 may reflect less price competition as some firms exited the telecommunications market following the end of the financial bubble in the sector." 10 56.
Similar trends in price rebalancing are observable in many other countries, including developing countries. For instance, in March 2002, the Malaysian government implemented a major tariff rebalance reducing long distance and international call fees more than 20 percent while increasing maximum residential line rentals 10 percent and local call fees by 25 percent. Although rural line rentals did not increase, it is claimed that the changes will "provide incentives to industry players to invest in infrastructure roll-out particularly to the rural areas". 
57.
Price rebalancing has been accepted by regulators since it is recognized that higher line rentals and local call charges that are more reflective of costs are in accord with economic efficiency and are necessary to make local markets more attractive to new entrants thereby increasing competition/contestability. However, price increases here are also politically unpopular and may be considered inequitable (unfair) since it is in these local markets that subscribers are vulnerable because they are unable to migrate to a competitive supplier (since none exist). Also, the largest beneficiaries of the price rebalancing are those who make significant international and long distance calls -often large corporate users and the relatively wealthy, while the costs are borne by low users.
58.
There is also concern that sharp increases in monthly rental charges can reduce affordability and thereby threaten the quest for universal service on the fixed network. Some might argue that this may not be undesirable if mobile telephony is a cheaper technology to deploy and tariff rebalancing for fixed service makes the cheaper technology relatively more attractive. However, Internet connection, especially high-speed connection is still dependent largely on access to fixed line service. Such concerns have led an increasing number of countries to apply price cap regulation as a means of controlling the nature, extent, speed and direction of price rebalancing permitted by 'equity' considerations. For instance, a price cap regime can limit the increase in monthly charges (e.g., to no more than CPI + 2%) as was done in the UK and Australia.
MECHANISMS AIMED AT THE SERVICE PROVIDER
59.
How have regulators sought to implement national access targets and affordability goals, once these have been defined? Generally, governments have imposed two types of universal service obligations (USOs) on operators. The first is a general obligation to provide service to all customers willing to pay for service at the regulated price. This obligation may be limited to certain geographic or population groups, such as a requirement to serve rural areas with population above a certain level. In addition, policy-makers and regulators have imposed obligations to extend certain types of designated services to a pre-specified number of subscribers or localities. These network build-out obligations are often incorporated into operators' licences.
Designating the Universal Service provider
60.
Some examples drawn from overseas practice are provided below.
Box 5. Some Examples of Universal Service Provider Designation
In Finland, the obligation to provide access at a fixed location is designated to the SMP operator (or secondarily to the operator with the biggest market share) in that particular area.
In the Netherlands, the USO is awarded to the operator with the lowest net cost.
In Austria, an auction is to be used, and if there is no tender, the USO will be designated.
In Greece, the designation mechanism has been changed. Whereas the incumbent traditionally has been the USO provider, since the liberalization of the telecommunications market, a competitive tender mechanism may be used.
In China, the six telecommunications operators were each assigned the responsibility for providing universal access in the form of two public payphones to each village in a number of designated provinces.
In the UK, BT is the designated USO provider.
In Ireland, the regulator re-designated the incumbent operator the USO provider following a detailed consultation process. A request for expressions of interest from alternative operators to become a USO provider was also made, but no expressions were received.
In Norway, the USO provider is designated by the Ministry based on criteria described in the regulatory framework.
In Denmark, the USO provider is designated on the basis of market share (combined with other criteria described in the telecommunications directives), but the legislation also allows a public tender.
In Germany, in situations where a universal service is not being adequately provided or there is reason to believe that such provision will not be ensured -a USO will be imposed. First, a voluntary solution, i.e. provision of the universal service without compensation, would be sought. Should there be no voluntary solution, the legislation gives two options: the USO may be imposed on the provider having a dominant position, or the USO provider would be selected by an auction process.
In Mexico, the incumbent operator (Telmex) was required as part of its privatization, to install payphones in 20,000 rural areas over a five-year period to meet the policy goal of ensuring some telephone access in all villages with at least 500 residents.
Universal Access/Service Fund
61.
Costing a universal access program has proven a complicated and contentious task. In principle, costs should be based on 'forward-looking' long-run incremental cost of efficient provision. However, many elements of 'judgment' are involved in estimating this cost and this can cause problems because an operator providing USO will have strong incentives to exaggerate the cost of provision to increase the subsidy received. For example, in Australia, the government's estimate of universal service cost was several times lower than Telstra's estimate. This led to the provision that to claim a subsidy from the Universal Service Fund, Telstra had to disclose its calculations of 'loss' to operators 'paying' for the UA. If Optus was dissatisfied with the cost estimate, it could challenge the estimate and could also ask the regulator that it (Optus) be designated to take over as universal service provider. This approach maintained pressure of a 'contestable market'.
62.
An advantage of this approach is that it made the costing process 'transparent' and placed the responsibility for cost verification on the parties with strong incentives and information to be vigilant about cost exaggeration (since they had to pay for the costs). Such an approach is consistent with sensible regulatory practice that makes operators resolve issues themselves as far as possible to reduce the information requirements and workload on regulators. To some extent this helped to contain the disposition to exaggerate the difficulties and cost of universal service delivery.
63.
Use of a UA Fund would allow more flexibility than mandating a particular operator using a specific prescribed technology. Also a universal access fund is more transparent, the cost can be much lower, and it can be designed to be competitively neutral (e.g., by requiring a broad range of operators to contribute to a Universal Service Fund) and technologically neutral.
64.
In developing countries, universal access funds have placed emphasis on ensuring basic public access (i.e. voice-grade fixed access to the public telecommunications network). But with the growing importance of the Internet to national economies, some funds are also supporting public access to valueadded services, including Internet access. In Chile, the government has redefined the UA Fund, which has been successful in extending basic telecommunications to rural and low-income areas, to support telecentre projects. In India too, telecentres are eligible for subsidies from the universal service fund.
Contributions from operators
65.
What percentage of revenue should be payable by operators? This would depend importantly of course on the amount of subsidy funding required from the fund. In countries that have installed a universal access fund, the levy has ranged from 1% (Argentina, Brazil), to 5% (India) and 6% (Malaysia). Table 3 below indicates some examples of contributions from operators required in a range of countries. 
66.
In deciding the contribution to be obtained from operator revenue, consideration should be given to the extent to which this revenue base might shrink because of the development of technologies that can bypass the traditional telephone network, such as VoIP, and because of the increasing inability to distinguish between local and long distance revenues 11 due to the emergence of service packages that bundle local, long distance and international services.
67.
Not all countries have been enthusiastic about establishing a Universal Service Fund. For example, in the European Union a universal service fund may be established by a Member State if it is concluded that the incumbent would be significantly competitively disadvantaged by being designated the universal service provider. It is notable that (so far) only France and Italy have decided to establish such a universal service fund.
68.
Contribution from government taxation revenue. Clearly the government can make a contribution to a USF from general taxation revenue as Chile has done.
69.
Contribution from spectrum auctions (3G), spectrum pricing and privatization. Some of the proceeds from telecommunications licence fees, including spectrum pricing fees, can be contributed to a USF. Also, part of the proceeds of spectrum auctions might be allocated to USO purposes. For example, there is a strong case for auctioning 3G licences and/or to charge operators allocated a spectrum licence, fees based on the "opportunity cost" of spectrum allocated. In addition, a proportion of the proceeds of privatization of telecommunications operators could be allocated to support universal access and universal service programs and, indeed, programs to bridge the digital divide. For instance, in Australia, 5% of the proceeds from privatising the second tranche of Telstra's shares were allocated to improving conditions in rural areas based on the rationale that this constitutes an equitable sharing.
70.
Contribution from local government and other government departments. Telecommunications can help to deliver improved service to education, health, agriculture, e-government and telecentres in rural and remote regions. Thus a number of government agencies might contribute to a Universal Service Fund to support telecommunications access. Allocating responsibility for delivering program outcomes to key spending ministries can have other benefits such as a shared sense of ownership across all participating ministries and local government. In addition, telecommunications operators can form partnerships with local government agencies to help ensure the initiative contributes to local economic development. Small business support could also be enlisted. For instance, any telecentres established are likely to be in a central location probably suitable for business activities. During the day a telecentre could be used for training for Internet use, etc, while at night it could be used for business activities. For example, it could be a suitable location for telecommunications operators to market their products, sell their pre-paid cards, etc., along lines of one-stop shopping.
71.
Asymmetric interconnection charges. Asymmetric interconnection fees could be used to increase the revenue from rural service: In short, higher interconnection charges could be charged for termination in rural and remote areas to reflect the higher costs of providing termination service in these areas. Such an approach is used in Chile and Peru, for example. Asymmetric interconnection regimes can be of particular importance to rural operators. Since rural operators' income can be largely based on incoming calls, asymmetric interconnection rates affect whether they will be financially viable. Such interconnection asymmetric charges can reduce the dependence on government subsidies.
11
In the United States, for example, all telecommunications companies that provide service between states contribute to the universal service fund, including long distance companies, local telephone companies, wireless companies, paging companies, and payphone providers, are required to contribute to the Federal Universal Service Fund. Carriers providing international service also must contribute. The contribution is calculated as a specific percentage of interstate and international end user revenue.
Competitive tendering for providing Universal Access -Latin American Examples
72.
In 1994, the Chilean government set up a fund financed by the national budget to improve access to public telephones in rural areas. The goal was to award subsidies through competitive bidding. The fund's budget in 1995 was aimed at covering 1,285 localities and permitting access to basic telecommunications services for the third of the population without access at that time. From 1995 to 1999, the Chilean government paid subsidies of US$21 million to support 183 projects providing public access telephones in 5,915 localities serving a population of about 2.2 million people. The bidding process was successful beyond expectation with the fund committing only 48% of its budget to achieve 90% of its plan (Wellenius et al., 2004) . Notably, bids requiring zero subsidy were made for 51% of the localities. Furthermore, the program led to private telecommunications investments several times the amount provided by the fund. The ITU estimates that each dollar of subsidy generated private investment of 1.4 dollars in public access telephones and 5 dollars in individual lines and other services 12 . Within five years of its establishment the fund had succeeded in extending access to basic voice telephony service to the majority of Chileans living in rural areas.
73.
Peru too uses a competitive tendering scheme to place public access telephones in selected rural localities. It differs from the Chilean scheme in also requiring Internet access cabins to be provided in district capitals within the same areas and because it is funded by operator levies rather than government.
Box 6. Steps in using a competitive tendering approach
A competitive tendering approach comprises the following main steps.
•The government defines the broad objectives, target population, and levels of funding for the subsidy program. It also establishes key service conditions such as types of service to be provided, quality standards, maximum retail prices, and duration of service commitments.
•Specific service needs and choices are primarily identified by prospective beneficiaries and communities. Economic and technical analysis is used to select and prioritize projects likely to be desirable from the perspective of the economy at large but not commercially viable on their own, and to determine the maximum subsidy justified for each project.
•Private firms submit competitive bids for these projects. Subject to meeting service conditions, bidders are free to develop their business strategies including choice of technology.
•Subsidies are awarded to bidders requiring the lowest one-time subsidies. Alternatively, bids are invited for fixed subsidies and awarded against other quantifiable service measures, such as the lowest price to end users or the fastest roll-out of service.
•Subsidies are paid in full or in installments linked to implementation of investments and start of service.
•Service providers own the facilities and bear all construction and commercial risks.
No additional subsidies are available downstream for the same services.
•The government monitors and enforces service quality and pricing standards, protects users against arbitrary changes of service, and provides investors with stable regulatory rules.
74.
It can be seen from Table 4 that the amount of subsidy actually bid for and granted can be less than half the maximum offered by the funds. However, the averages hide a wide range of experiences, from zero subsidies in some of the early Chilean tenders, to 100% of the offered amount in later rounds. 
Box 7. Universal Service and competitive tendering in India
The approach to universal access in India provides an interesting example of the way that a country with a very large population and number of rural villages is addressing its UA concerns.
A bidding process was used to provide Rural Community Phones through the Universal Service Obligation (USO) Fund in 48,310 villages with a population in excess of 2,000 where no other public telephone facility was available. The competitive bidding reportedly resulted in lowering the cost of the project by about 17% from the reserve price.
The USO Fund Administration is proceeding with plans to cover all 570,000 villages with public phones. It has already signed agreements for disbursal of subsidy from the Fund to support the more than 520,000 Village Public Telephones (VPTs) already installed. The bids for the remaining 57,000 villages have also been invited. Agreements have also been signed for replacement of more than 180,000 VPTs on Multi Access Radio Relay (MARR) technology.
In addition, the Department of Telecommunications will invite bids to set up Tele-Information Centres to provide access for both voice and data in villages with a population of more than 2,000. So far, over US$100 million has been disbursed as subsidy to the Universal Service Providers.
Support through the USO fund is also being provided to subsidise the capital and operating cost of Direct Exchange Lines (DELs) installed in rural areas after the beginning of 2002. About 3.1 million rural DELs had been installed as of the end of March 2004. Bids have also been invited for providing telecommunications facilities to new rural subscribers.
Source: Telecommunications Regulation Authority of India (TRAI).
75.
The use of competitive tendering has a number of advantages, including:
• the speed with which tenders can be conducted thus leading to quick implementation of universal service arrangements;
• the ability of competitive tendering to reveal information about each bidders true valuation of the cost of providing universal service obligations; and
• the increased incentives for bidders to decrease costs in order to win the tender to provide service in particular areas. 
76.
Drawing on the lessons of experience, Box 6 indicates some desirable aspects of a universal access fund.
Box 8. Features of a good Universal Access Fund
Independent administration -not related to telecommunications operators
Transparent financing
Market and technology neutral -does not favor incumbent operators or new entrants or specific technologies Funding targeted to specific beneficiaries (e.g., high cost regions, unserved rural areas, low income populations, educational & health sectors) Subsidies should be relatively small and should only subsidize the uneconomic portion of service; operators should finance the rest Competitive bidding process for universal access projects: i.e., lowest bidder should be awarded subsidy and right to build and operate networks to expand service. 
Demand side initiatives
77.
Demand side initiatives are also important. For instance, the government's significant purchasing power can help to increase a country's telecommunications infrastructure in rural and remote areas, particularly where used to initiate demand aggregation. The 'core' of aggregation possibilities include schools and health institutions, agencies interested in promoting telemedicine, public safety, community networks, community learning centers, tourism related products, teleworking, etc. Demand aggregation has been successful in attracting telecommunications supply, including broadband, to rural and remote areas in a number of countries 13 .
MECHANISMS AIMED AT ASSISTING THE CONSUMER
78.
Market forces -even where efficient -are less able to serve low income, disadvantaged, disabled consumers in both urban as well as rural areas. A number of schemes involving subsidies and other assistance programs exist in various countries to help ensure that such disadvantaged customers have access to basic telephony services. Most offer a concession on certain charges to eligible old-age, disadvantaged, disabled or low income consumers for basic telecommunications services. Discounts are usually offered in respect to connection charges, monthly access charges and usage charges so that the rate of growth of a "lower quartile bill" is constrained. In the UK, the universal service provider is required to offer special services to customers with disabilities including text relay (that translates voice into text) for people who are deaf or hard-of-hearing, special format telephone bills for people who are blind or partially sighted, and a priority fault repair service.
79.
In Australia, for example, the incumbent carrier, Telstra, is obliged under its Carrier Licence Conditions, to offer products and services to address the needs of low-income customers. Telstra's "Access for Everyone" scheme contains programs that target low-income Australians within the following seven segments: age pensioners; people with a disability; transient and homeless people; job seekers; people from non-English speaking backgrounds; indigenous Australians; low-income families. Similar schemes exist in a number of other countries such as the US, UK and Ireland as set out below. 
Country Scheme details
Ireland Vulnerable user scheme. 1 Customer gets line rental and €5 worth of calls for €23.65 per month. Once the €5 worth of calls is used up, user pays double the usual rates for the next €6 worth of calls. Caller will therefore not be more than €1 a month worse off under the scheme. The aim of the scheme is to limit increases in the size of vulnerable users' telephone bills where they have relatively low levels of usage. The median bill of those customers who use the scheme will not increase by more than CPI-0%, which is the cap on the current Lower Quartile bill. UK Light user scheme. 
80.
In addition to specific subsidies targeted at disadvantaged and low income groups, various other approaches are sometimes used to ensure that consumers are able to access affordable telecommunications services. These usually take the form of price controls and price capping requirements on the dominant operator designed to ensure that prices for basic telecommunications services do not increase by more than a specified amount. In Australia, for example, the price for untimed local calls was not to increase above 22 cents for calls made from a residential or business phone, and 40 cents for calls made from a public phone; line rentals charged at residential rates were not to be increased without prior consultation with the regulator; Telstra has to notify the minister in advance if it intended to alter charges for directory assistance services, with the minister able to disallow the proposed changes if they were considered to be against the public interest; and Telstra was to offer a line rental service to schools at a price at or below the standard line rental offered to residential customers.
81.
The price caps in Australia (and in the range of other countries applying price cap regulation) are designed in part to provide assistance to low-income consumers so that they have access to affordable local call services. The arrangements are also aimed at ensuring that metropolitan and non-metropolitan call prices remain at broadly similar levels thus safeguarding rural consumers from high local call prices.
The Phoneless
82.
Even where well-designed universal access/universal service policies have succeeded in increasing teledensity and telephone penetration to internationally best practice levels, in many countries it is likely that there will remain a percentage of the population without access to a telephone service. This is true even in countries like the US and Canada where telephone penetration exceeds 90% of the population. Studies in a number of countries, including the US 14 and Canada 15 , indicate that phonelessness is usually associated with multiple contributing factors, only some of which might be tackled through universal service policies. These factors include:
• Poverty and Unemployment. A study by the FCC concluded that low income and unemployment had a significant negative impact on telephone ownership in the US. The study found that approximately 30% of welfare and public assistance recipients did not have telephone service. In addition, more than two-thirds of those households without service had annual incomes of $15,000 or less. Approximately 50% of households headed by females with children living at or below the poverty line did not have a telephone 16 . Similarly in Canada, approximately 88% of those without a telephone had incomes below the Statistics Canada Low Income Cut Off. 17 • Mobility. The FCC study found that in the US, tenants were six times more likely than owners to be without a telephone. In Californian regions with telephone subscriber levels below 90%, more than 50% of phoneless people had lived at their current address for less than one year 18 .
• Minority Groups. Minority group telephone penetration rates in the US have been estimated to be 8 to 10 percentage points lower than the general population 19 . Similar results have been found in Canada. For example, in the Manitoba region, where average penetration in 1997 was 97.8%, the average penetration rate for First Nation communities was 73.2%. 20 
83.
Many of these issues clearly go beyond the scope of universal service programs and might be overcome only through appropriately designed social, employment and incomes policies. Nevertheless, there is scope for well targeted assistance provided as part of a universal service program to alleviate some of the barriers to phone ownership. Practical options which have the potential to assist in reducing phonelessness include:
• Reviewing disconnection procedures to help customers unable to pay for long distance service to stay connected to local service. The information collected in the US and Canada indicates that many of the phoneless were disconnected because of difficulties in managing their use of and payment for long distance services.
• Providing low cost or free blocking services for long distance or expensive information-related services.
• Providing "quick dial" or "warm line" service so that customers who have been disconnected continue to have access to emergency services.
• Requiring telephone operators to offer the option of an installment payment plan or a bad debt repayment plan to customers, thus allowing customers to maintain local call service while making repayments.
• Providing more substantial discounts off the monthly access fees for basic telephony service for those meeting eligibility requirements. One of the main reasons given by non-subscribers for being unable to acquire a telephone service is that existing subsidy schemes do little to offset the high cost of the monthly access charges levied by telecommunications operators 21 .
• Ensuring greater awareness of assistance programs through public announcements and targeted advertising. In the US, some states have set up "Marketing Boards" to market and publicize Lifeline, Link-Up and other assistance programs available to existing and prospective telephone customers.
TOWARDS MORE COST EFFECTIVE UNIVERSAL SERVICE ADMINISTRATION
Towards systematic development of universal service strategy
84.
With the rapid development of telecommunications, countries should already be thinking or rethinking longer term policies. In the context of universal access/service policy, this means bearing in mind how shorter term programs support longer term Universal Service and digital divide policy objectives within an increasingly competitive, technologically dynamic telecommunications environment.
85.
The lessons of experience suggest that a country should develop a universal service strategy in a systematic manner in order to identify the source of any problems identified and then specifically address them with tailored cost-effective measures. Any redefinition of the scope of universal service and universal access should also be conducted on the basis of a transparent systematic review of universal access objectives and targets pertinent to that country. In some countries, e.g., Australia, Hungary, the UK and India, the strategy development procedure commenced with a public consultation document that sought the views of various stakeholders. This approach to defining UA and USO would be consistent with the transparency required by the WTO Reference Paper provision relating to universal service.
86.
A systematic review of universal service programs should be based on (at least) the considerations set out in Box 9. 
1) Clear and specific articulation of the objectives and coverage of universal service
It is crucial to specify the intended beneficiaries clearly. In this regard, it would help to break down the broad objective of universal access into a range of distinct, realizable and measurable targets for its sub-components.
2)Identification of barriers to universal service
Such information is necessary to guide the development of effective universal service policies.
3) Identify schemes that could cost-effectively address the identified barriers to universal service
To maintain the benefits of a competitive or 'contestable' market in the delivery of universal service, the option for a universal service provider to be replaced by a more cost-effective supplier should be preserved.
4) Estimate the cost of programmes for universal service
The costing principles, process and outcomes should be transparent and subject to audit; it should be subject to regular disclosure. 
Criteria for sustainable USO support
87.
The lessons of experience also suggest that the choice of implementation mechanisms for UA delivery should be guided by a range of criteria, including:
• Sufficiency: Does the mechanism ensure comparability of service and prices between urban and rural customers in a sustainable manner? • Affordability: Does the mechanism enable providers to offer the supported services in an affordable manner? • Competition: Does the mechanism minimize distortions to competition; does it encourage and facilitate competition by precisely targeting support to high cost disadvantaged customers? • Flexibility: Is the mechanism able to evolve as new technologies are introduced, as competition develops and as the definition of USO changes over time? • Protection and advancement: Does the mechanism prevent degradation of the existing infrastructure and the current level of service? Does the mechanism produce an investment incentive to upgrade facilities used to provide universal service? • Portability: Can the mechanism provide all eligible operators with an appropriate amount of support in a competitively neutral manner? • Predictability: Does the mechanism enable an operator to determine in advance the amount of support it will receive on behalf of a customer? • Practicality: Is the mechanism economically and administratively viable?
• Transparency: Is the mechanism transparent and open to monitoring and review?
• Cost-effectiveness: Does the mechanism enable objectives to be achieved at least cost?
The administration of USO programs
88.
Cost-effective administration of universal service programs is also important. For instance, while some universal service funds (e.g., in Columbia) are administered by government ministries, other funds are administered by the regulator (e.g., Australia, Peru, Chile). A number of countries, such as the US and South Africa, have set up a specific agency to deal exclusively with the administration of the universal service programs.
89.
Some studies have concluded that a separate and independent regulatory agency achieves the best results in regard to universal service in both developed and developing countries 22 . But irrespective of whether an industry regulator or an agency specifically set up to provide universal service is responsible for administering the universal service framework, the principles of economical, effective and efficient administration should be followed. This means that the universal service framework must be transparent, accountable, targeted, proportional and consistent in its decisions 23 .
90.
Countries have used various mechanisms to ensure the transparency and cost-effectiveness in the administration of universal service funds. These have included regular reporting mechanisms to the public and to the government; regular and independent auditing of the financial and procedural administration of the funds; and the creation of procedures for regulatory impact assessment of the rules and regulations created by the regulatory agencies regarding the implementation of universal service policies.
Performance Measurement, Efficiency Review and Auditing
91.
A number of countries, including the US, Australia, the UK, Hong Kong (China) and Uganda, have installed mechanisms for ongoing assessment of the performance of the agency responsible for the universal service framework and the auditing of programs used to deliver universal service. The assessment can take the form of financial auditing of the cost and revenue information upon which the universal service cost is calculated and allocated among operators 24 , performance auditing of the practices and procedures employed by the agency in administering the universal service framework, and auditing of the recipients of universal serviced funds.
22
Martha GarcÃ-a-Murillo and Brenden Kuerbis, "The effect of institutional constraints on the success of universal service policies ", 2003. 23 Transparency refers to the regulatory process being open to public scrutiny. This may involve the requirement to circulate draft decisions for comment, consult with the public generally and with interested or affected parties prior to making decisions and publish decisions once they are made. A transparent regulatory regime allows the public to appreciate the grounds for regulatory decisions. Accountability involves the regulator being answerable to the public the Minister or to parliament. A targeted regulatory framework is one which ensures that regulatory decisions are designed to resolve the specific issue at hand and does not unintentionally impact or overreach into other markets or industry participants. Proportionality is concerned with ensuring that the breadth, depth and severity of regulation is proportional to the problem it is designed to resolve. That is, the scope and intensity of regulation should reflect the seriousness of the problem it is attempting to resolve. Finally, consistency in regulatory decisions involves the regulator's actions becoming predictable over time and across similar issues. This provides certainty to public and private sector participants and provides incentives for investment and private initiative by reducing regulatory risk. 
92.
For example, in Australia, the National Audit Office undertakes performance audits of the Australian Communications Authority (ACA) with the aim of assessing the financial management effectiveness and the adequacy of the agency's administrative practices as they relate to the administration of the universal service framework. The audit evaluates the ACA's universal service levy collection practices, levy assessment systems, arrangements for banking of receipts, record keeping systems, levy collection risk management policies, internal accounting systems and reporting and corporate governance arrangements 25 . Similarly, in 2001 the UK undertook an efficiency audit of several industry regulators, including the then telecommunications regulator, Oftel, to assess whether the operations of these agencies provide cost-effective and responsive regulatory processes and outcomes 26 . In the US, formal audits of Erate beneficiaries (both service providers and applicants) are conducted to assess overall program compliance and to identify instances of overpayment of universal service grants 27 .
Regulatory Impact Assessment
93.
A number of countries require regulatory agencies to undertake a regulatory impact assessment as part of the decision making framework. Regulatory impact assessment requires an assessment of the costs and benefits of each option that has been considered by the regulatory agency, followed by a recommendation supporting the most effective and efficient option 28 .
CONCLUSION
95. This paper concludes that market liberalization in the telecommunications sector has resulted in improvement in telecommunications penetration and lower prices in overall terms and, accordingly, affordability. The penetration of mobile telecommunications has increased in a spectacular manner, in important part because of competition and technological developments such as pre-paid service. As a result, the number of households without telephone service has declined significantly.
96.
Valuable experience has been gained regarding the ingredients for a successful policy approach.
97.
With the dramatic changes in telecommunications technology now occurring (and those on the horizon), it seems especially important that governments harness the full support of market forces to address universal access and universal service. This includes adopting a technology-neutral policy and facilitating market entry of new entrants, including those with new technologies, into telecommunications markets to allow benefits of technological developments to be quickly introduced.
98.
Policy measures --such as market liberalization supported by effective pro-competitive regulation --are probably as important as declining technology costs. But there are areas that seem beyond the reach of market forces alone. Here mechanisms used to support service providers appear to have been successful in providing incentives/subsidies to encourage provision in areas not previously supplied. In some cases, mechanisms directed at low income, disadvantaged consumers may be more effective in helping to ensure that such customers can obtain affordable service, choose tariff packages, control their expenditure and pay their bills in ways that are more tailored to their particular needs.
99.
Systematic monitoring and evaluation based on good up-to-date data is critically important to ensure that universal service targets are being achieved according to schedule. Also important are regular "audits" of the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the administration of a universal service program.
